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Chapter One 
De Casibus Tragedy: Marlowe’s Tamburlaine the Great 
Andrew Duxfield 
 
Introduction 
 
Tragedie is to seyn a certeyn storie, 
As olde books maken us memorie, 
Of hym that stood in greet prosperitee, 
And is yfallen out of heigh degree 
Into miserie, and endeth wrecchedly.1 
  
So says Chaucer’s monk in the prologue to his contribution to The Canterbury Tales (c. 
1388–1400). His tale represents the first notable English contribution to a tradition that began 
with an earlier fourteenth-century Latin work by Giovanni Boccaccio, the title of which is 
reproduced in the tale’s headnote: ‘Here bigynneth the Monkes Tale / De Casibus Virorum 
Illustrium [on the fates of famous men]’.2 Boccaccio’s De Casibus (c. 1355–60) is a 
voluminous collection of exemplary prose narratives detailing the demise of great historical, 
biblical and mythological figures. The stories are varied and complex, but their overriding 
theme is the mutability of Fortune; they teach the powerful that what they might presume to 
be a permanent state of prosperity is in fact liable to be overturned at any moment and that in 
such circumstances it is unwise to invest heavily or take excessive pride in earthly matters. In 
The Canterbury Tales, the monk follows the Boccaccian model in offering his own much 
shorter set of tales, detailing the falls of figures from Lucifer to Croesus, but departs from 
Boccaccio in referring to them as tragedies. The monk’s definition of the term differs in some 
important ways from the conventional, Aristotelian model of tragedy to which students of 
Renaissance literature are so often referred. Firstly, these tragedies are to be found in old 
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books rather than on the stage. Secondly, the monk tells us that tragedy deals in the fall of 
great men from prosperity to ruin, but gives no indication of why these men suffer this fate; 
in this kind of tragedy, the great man falls not as a logical and predictable result of a 
particular flaw or wrongdoing, but, conversely, as a demonstration of the arbitrary and 
illogical nature of earthly events.  
 
Chaucer’s tragic model is consistent with a widespread medieval understanding of tragedy as  
a genre of historical writing that encouraged a contempt for worldly matters by demonstrating 
the inconstancy of Fortune. According to this understanding, tragic downfalls are not 
punishments but expressions of the idea that Fortune ultimately catches up with all of us, 
whoever we might happen to be (although, as we will see, this model would often awkwardly 
co-exist within the same texts with a more providential logic). By the time the professional 
theatres were flourishing in late Elizabethan London, this notion of tragedy had lost its 
monopoly, as dramatists turned to classical precursors such as Seneca for inspiration. 
Nonetheless, the de casibus tradition continued to flourish in the second half of the sixteenth 
century, and continued to exert influence over the creative work of early modern dramatists. 
In this essay, as well as briefly tracing the genealogy of the de casibus tradition from 
Boccaccio to Elizabethan London, I will examine the influence of and engagement with the 
de casibus tradition in Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine the Great (1587). In this reading, 
I aim to show that Marlowe’s drama exploits a tension that lies at the heart of the all de 
casibus tragedy: namely that between understandings of worldly events as governed by 
divine providence, on the one hand, or by the whims of Fortune, on the other. Marlowe’s 
indebtedness to the drama of the medieval period has been long established; here I hope to 
demonstrate the imaginative use he makes of the period’s narrative and poetic tradition. 
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The English de casibus tradition 
 
While ‘The Monk’s Tale’ is the earliest English engagement with De Casibus Virorum 
Illustrium, the most significant contribution to the establishment of an English de casibus 
tradition was made by John Lydgate, who in 1431 began work on The Fall of Princes, an 
ambitious poetic translation of Boccaccio’s work. The Fall of Princes is both a loose and an 
indirect translation; Lydgate based his text on Les Cas des nobles hommes et femmes, a 
French translation — itself somewhat liberal — of Boccacchio’s De Casibus by Laurent de 
Premierfait. Lydgate makes considerable alterations to both the Latin and French versions, 
including the introduction of a framing narrative device in which the poem’s tragic figures, 
from Adam and Eve to John II of France, present themselves one after another and relate 
their stories to ‘John Bochas’, who is working on De Casibus in his study. Another crucial 
departure from Lydgate’s sources seems to have originated in a demand from his patron, 
Duke Humphrey of Gloucester, who stipulated that an ‘envoy’ — a short verse postscript — 
should be added to each narrative, detailing for the reader the political and ethical lessons to 
be gleaned from its events.3 
 
Lydgate’s patronage by such a senior establishment figure, and the apparent attempt by that 
patron to enforce a degree of moral certitude on the poet’s work, have contributed to a sense, 
predominant for much of its critical history, that The Fall of Princes is essentially an exercise 
in bland conservatism, conceived in the service of established power and eked out on an 
unnecessarily grand scale.4 Of particular note is an exquisitely brutal literary-critical hatchet 
job by Joseph Ritson, who in his Bibliographica Poetica (1802) lamented the ‘stupid and 
fatigueing productions’ of ‘this voluminous, prosaic, and drivelling monk’.5 Nevertheless, the 
reputation of Lydgate, and of English poetry between Chaucer and Wyatt more broadly, has 
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undergone some rehabilitation since the latter part of the twentieth century, with critics 
beginning to observe a degree of subversive vitality and political engagement in the work.6  
 
Whatever the vicissitudes of its modern critical afterlife, The Fall of Princes was an 
undoubted success at the time of its production, and for at least a century after that. Despite 
its ‘colossal length … and the consequent expense of production’, A. S. G. Edwards notes 
that the poem ‘survives complete in nearly forty fifteenth-century manuscripts, many high 
quality productions’, and that these manuscripts ‘continued to be read into the sixteenth 
century’.7 Richard Pynson produced the first printed edition of the poem in 1494, and it was 
reprinted once in 1527 and three times in or around 1554. These would prove to be the last 
editions before the twentieth century.8 In 1555 an ultimately abortive project was underway 
to produce an edition of Lydgate’s Fall of Princes with a continuation that both brought it up 
to date and turned its attention to English concerns. While this edition did not transpire — 
possibly as a result of official suppression — the preparations put in place for it would, four 
years later, give rise to the first edition of The Mirror for Magistrates (1559).9  
 
The Mirror was a project executed by a committee of writers headed by William Baldwin.10 
While the Mirror was not, as had been initially planned, published as an extension of The 
Fall of Princes, Baldwin’s preface to the reader makes clear the influence of Lydgate’s poem 
both in the origin of the project and in the process of its completion; as well as noting the 
project’s original intention to go ‘from where as Bochas lefte, unto the presente time’, 
Baldwin notes that once his syndicate of seven co-authors was assembled, he ‘resorted vnto 
them, bering with me the booke of Bochas, translated by Dan Lidgate, for better obseruacion 
of his order’.11 Despite this clear statement of its genealogy, however, the approach of the 
Mirror differs from that of the Fall in a number of interesting ways. The text dispenses with 
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Lydgate’s envoys, instead interlinking the tragedies with prose sections in which Baldwin 
and his committee of writers discuss the aesthetic merits and ethical and political implications 
of what has preceded; while these discussions usually result in a consensus, this device 
allows a plurality of responses to each of the stories to be voiced in a way that is not 
facilitated by Lydgate’s model. The tragedies themselves take on a more immediate form: the 
intermediary narrative device — ‘Bochas’ — is here dispensed with, and the subject of each 
tragedy instead narrates his or her own demise, in most cases finishing with a short lament 
that, along with the prose links, takes over some of the didactic functions of Lydgate’s 
envoys. Fulfilling the promise to produce a Fall of Princes specifically focused on English 
concerns, the 1559 edition of the Mirror follows the events of the Wars of the Roses, from 
the reigns of Richard II to Edward IV, using Edward Hall’s Chronicles as its principal 
source.12  
 
The 1559 edition of Mirror was only the first instalment of a continually evolving project. 
There followed an edition of 1563, which added a new series of tragedies taking the 
narratives to the end of the reign of Richard III, and further adjustments occurred in an 
edition of 1578. Alongside this, what has tended to be considered an alternative Mirror 
tradition emerged in 1574, with the publication of John Higgins’s The First Part of the 
Mirror for Magistrates, which applied the de casibus treatment to Britain’s mythical past, 
from the country’s founder Brutus to its defender against the invasions of Julius Caesar, 
Nennius. This work was published by Thomas Marshe, who subsequently reprinted the 
‘original’ Mirror under the title The Last Part of the Mirror for Magistrates. Higgins’s 
prequel was followed in 1578 by Thomas Blenerhasset’s The Second Part of The Mirror for 
Magistrates, which continued the narrative to the reign of King Harold. The convoluted 
publication history of the Mirror took a final turn in 1587, around the time Marlowe was 
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enjoying his first public theatrical success with Tamburlaine the Great, when an edition was 
published which combined the ‘original’ Mirror with Higgins’s ‘First Part’, incorporated 
further additions but omitted Blenerhasset’s second part.13 The work also engendered a 
steady flow of imitations and responses: Willard Farnham identifies a significant number of 
such works that appeared in the latter quarter of the sixteenth century, including ten in the last 
two years of Marlowe’s life.14 To talk about The Mirror for Magistrates, then, is to talk not 
about a single work with a unilateral ethical and aesthetic identity but about an evolving, 
polyvocal and textually unstable tradition. It was a collaborative project which quickly 
outgrew its original conceptual boundaries and underwent a thirty-year process of 
emendation, re-iteration, and appropriation. This process helped to ensure that tragic verse 
narratives concerning the instability of worldly fortune enjoyed a period of vitality in 
England that was relatively unbroken from the late fourteenth century to the emergence of 
tragedy on the public stages in the late sixteenth century.  
 
Providence and Fortune  
 
Lydgate’s Fall is explicit from its outset regarding the determining role Fortune will play in 
the work. The work’s prologue states the author’s hope that ‘sundry princes’, upon reading 
the work, would understand 
That thinges all where fortune may attayne 
Be transitorye of condicion 
for she of kynde is hasty and sodeyn 
Contrariouse her course for to restreyne 
Of wilfulnesse she is so variable 
Whan men moost trust than is she moost chaungable15  
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Likewise, in the prologue to the Mirror, Baldwin relates how the work’s printer had asked 
him 
to procure to haue the storye contynewed from where as Bochas lefte, vnto this 
presente time, chiefly of suche as Fortune had dalyed with here in this ylande: which 
might be as a myrrour for al men as well noble as others, to show the slyppery 
deceytes of the waueryng lady, and the due reward of all kinde of vices.16 
The fickleness of Fortune is ostensibly the root from which the moral universe of the de 
casibus tradition springs; the reader should learn that the pursuit, and even the attainment, of 
earthly power is at best precarious and at worst futile, since Fortune’s defining characteristic 
is that she is always liable to execute a ‘sodeyn’ and ‘slyppery’ redistribution of her favour. 
The enduring visual encapsulation of this idea is, of course, her wheel, on which those who 
are carried to the top are soon guaranteed a sharp descent. From these stories, the respective 
prologues suggest, a reader will come to understand that the concerns of this world ought to 
be held in contempt, since terrestrial success or failure depend not on merit or culpability, but 
on the arbitrary whims of Fortune. Better to live a simple life devoted to the consideration of 
spiritual truths and devotion to God, whose realm is not subject to the mutability that reigns 
in the sublunary world.  
 
This contemptus mundi morality, and its manifestation in the de casibus tradition from 
Boccaccio onwards, owes a great deal to Boethius’s sixth-century work The Consolation of 
Philosophy, in which Fortune’s wheel makes its earliest known appearance. In The 
Consolation, the imprisoned and condemned Boethius is transfigured from a state of 
lamentation to one of enlightenment by a debate with Lady Philosophy, who teaches him that 
the losses he so keenly feels are not really losses at all: 
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I know the many disguises of that monster, Fortune, and the extent to which she 
seduces with friendship the very people she is striving to cheat, until she overwhelms 
them with grief at the suddenness of her desertion. If you can recall to mind her 
character, her methods, and the kind of favour she proffers, you will see that in her 
you did not have and did not lose anything of value.17 
Through his dialogue with Philosophy, Boethius comes to realise that material fortune is 
essentially meaningless, and that the true good resides in philosophical and spiritual wisdom: 
‘Why’, asks Philosophy, ‘do you mortal men seek after happiness outside yourselves, when it 
lies within you?’.18 It is in Boethius that contemptus mundi philosophy, argued on the basis of 
the earthly sovereignty of Fortune, is given its most sophisticated and enduring expression, 
and it is an expression of this philosophy with which the late-medieval de casibus authors 
were familiar; Chaucer translated the text into middle English, a fact to which Lydgate refers 
in the prologue to The Fall.19  
 
In inheriting this Boethian world view, however, the de casibus authors also inherited a 
problem with which Boethius himself wrestles in the Consolation. The idea of Fortune’s 
predominance over earthly concerns provides a clear logical basis for holding the world in 
contempt, but it also sits rather uncomfortably alongside any notion of divine providence. If 
God is truly omnipotent, how can the responsibility for earthly successes and failures be 
attributed to an entirely arbitrary force? If God knows all, he must know all future events, 
which in turn means that their occurrence must already have been pre-established; but how 
can events be simultaneously random and preordained? While Boethius attributes earthly 
successes and failures to the ‘domineering hand’ of Fortune, he is unwilling to accept the 
apparently logical conclusion that arises from this: that earthly affairs, since governed by 
chance, lie outside the remit of God’s plan.20 Boethius tackles this problem with a discussion 
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of temporal metaphysics. Since God is eternal, he experiences time in a different manner to 
those who are not eternal; those belonging to the latter group live through time in a linear 
fashion, moving from a past that has happened into a future that is yet to exist. In contrast, 
Boethius has Philosophy define the eternal as ‘the complete, simultaneous and perfect 
possession of everlasting life’;21 to be eternal is not simply to live forever, but to live an 
existence that encompasses all eternity at once, in an eternal present. Therefore, the argument 
goes, God’s knowledge of what for a mortal being is a future event does not render it 
predetermined, as His knowledge of it is not, strictly speaking, foreknowledge. As such, God 
can possess eternal knowledge of events without predetermining their occurrence, and, 
accordingly, his omnipotence need not obviate the earthly tyranny of Fortune.22 
 
The late medieval and early modern de casibus authors who drew inspiration from Boethius 
were less able, however, to neatly reconcile the idea of a world governed by Fortune with that 
of a world in which Earthly misdeeds are visited with divine punishment. The standard 
position in the limited early-twentieth century criticism on the de casibus tradition was to 
suggest that in its late-medieval manifestation — in Chaucer and Lydgate — it maintained a 
contemptus mundi morality based on Fortune, while in its early modern manifestations — the 
various iterations of the Mirror — it gravitated towards a morality based on a direct 
providential relationship between the wickedness of one’s actions and the grisliness of one’s 
fate. Henry H. Adams states, for example, that ‘during the sixteenth century the idea of 
fortune gradually retreated in the minds of writers, to be replaced by that of God’s retributive 
justice’.23 According to this view, the tradition begins with Boccaccio adhering strictly to 
Fortune as the motivating logic informing his narratives, develops via Lydgate, who retains a 
predominantly Fortune-based morality but who introduces a providential reasoning to a 
number of his tragedies, and culminates in the Mirror, which pays lip service to the whims of 
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Fortune but which ultimately settles on a monitory rationale based on divine retribution (note 
that in the passage quoted above Baldwin promises to show both the ‘slyppery deceytes of 
the wauerying lady’ and ‘the due reward of all kinde of vices’). 24 This shift was, according to 
an influential study by Willard Farnham, accompanied by a related move away from a 
medieval-minded contempt for the world, which Fortune was so useful in fostering, and 
towards a more Renaissance-minded worldliness informed by humanism and emergent 
notions of individualism.25  
 
As interest in the de casibus tradition has revived since the late twentieth century, though, the 
linearity of this progression from Fortune to providence, and from contempt for the world to 
worldliness, has been increasingly called into question. As early as 1949, William Peery 
made a case for the Mirror being much less unilaterally providentialist in its outlook than the 
critical consensus had previously asserted, while three decades later Frederick Kiefer argued 
that Fortune and providence play oppositional yet complementary roles in the text, the former 
serving to provide an ethical rationale in those narratives where the historical source material 
appears resistant to a providential explication.26 The earlier end of the linear progression from 
Fortune to providence has also been subjected to complication by recent criticism: Nigel 
Mortimer identifies the co-existence in The Fall of Princes of envoys attributing the events of 
its narratives on the one hand to Fortune and on the other to Providence, while Paul Strohm 
argues that Lydgate’s poem infuses the contemptus mundi narratives which he inherited from 
Boccachio and Premierfait with a proto-Machiavellian interest in worldly pragmatism.27 
From the early days of its introduction into English literary culture, then, the de casibus 
tragedy is a polyvalent phenomenon, characterised by competing ethical and theological ways 
of understanding the events of history. Inherent to the genre, in particular, are tensions along 
two axes: one between earthly Fortune and divine providence, and another between contempt 
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for the world and a concerted interest in terrestrial matters. Taking Christopher Marlowe’s 
Tamburlaine the Great as a case in point, I aim to show some of the ways in which 
Elizabethan stage tragedy made extensive creative use of these tensions. 
 
 
Tamburlaine the Great and the de casibus tradition 
 
To read the two parts of Tamburlaine the Great as de casibus tragedy — or at least as 
representing an engagement with the de casibus tradition — is to take an unusual but not a 
unique approach. Two critics who have conducted such readings are Willard Farnham, as part 
of his large-scale study of the ‘medieval heritage’ of early modern drama, and, more recently, 
Troni Y. Grande.28 Both critics read the plays as recalling but in one way or another wilfully 
undermining the moral logic of de casibus tragedy. Farnham goes as far as to describe 
Tamburlaine as ‘a medieval tragedy reversed, a rebellious violation of all that De Casibus 
tragedy had set out to convey’.29 Where the de casibus tradition promoted a contempt for, or 
at the very least a suspicion of, earthly achievements, Marlowe ‘gave himself completely to a 
drama of untrammeled worldly success’.30 In a similar reading, Grande contends that the 
plays generate a radical ambiguity by interweaving conventions belonging to two distinct and 
contradictory genres: on the one hand, de casibus tragedy, which for Grande demands that the 
protagonist’s earthly pride should occasion a fitting and monitory punishment, and, on the 
other, an instance of an emergent ‘heroic tragedy’, which unashamedly valorises its 
protagonist’s worldly achievements. Both of these readings are illuminating and inform much 
of what follows, but my own reading will depart from them in a couple of important ways. 
Firstly, Farnham’s interpretation in particular relies upon an understanding of Tamburlaine as 
an unequivocal celebration of its protagonist’s achievements. Criticism on the plays over the 
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last thirty years has done much to complicate that notion, and a reading of the play in relation 
to the de casibus tradition needs to account for the work’s now widely recognised moral 
ambiguity.31 Secondly, where Grande conceives of the Tamburlaine plays as exhibiting a 
generic tension between a straightforwardly providential version of de casibus tragedy and a 
heroic form of tragedy that runs directly counter to it, I read the plays as exploiting and 
manipulating tensions between competing conceptions of tragedy that are already present 
within the de casibus tradition.  
 
Regardless of what conclusions one draws from them, the parallels with and allusions to the 
de casibus tradition are numerous in the Tamburlaine plays. In its closing lines, the prologue 
encourages the audience to ‘View but his picture in this tragic glass / And then applaud his 
fortunes as you please’ (I.Prologue.7–8), simultaneously evoking the notion of tragedy-as-
mirror — a notion doubtless reinvigorated by the recent publication of a new edition of 
Mirror for Magistrates — and alluding to the concept of fortune. Fortune is a subject to 
which the plays return with metronomic regularity, as characters variously celebrate, bemoan, 
defy or appeal to her primacy. Some of these references are made in passing and suggest a 
presumption of Fortune’s supremacy: early in the first part, for example, Menaphon counsels 
Cosroe not to lament the incompetent kingship of his brother, Mycetes, ‘Since Fortune gives 
you opportunity / To gain the title of a conqueror / By curing of this maimèd empery’ 
(I.1.1.124–26), while in the opening scene of the second the Natolian king Orcanes reveals 
the true nature of his fears: ‘Slavonians, Almains, Rutters, Muffs and Danes / Fear not 
Orcanes, but great Tamburlaine — / Nor he, but Fortune that hath made him great’ (II.1.1.58–
60). A more sustained appeal to a traditional de casibus understanding of Fortune is made by 
Callapine, who in anticipation of his final confrontation with the Scythian conqueror takes 
comfort from the deity’s renowned mutability: 
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We shall not need to nourish any doubt 
But that proud Fortune, who hath followed long 
The martial sword of mighty Tamburlaine, 
Will now retain her old inconstancy 
And raise our honours to as high a pitch 
In this our strong and fortunate encounter 
(II.3.1.27–32) 
 
For Callapine, Tamburlaine’s downfall is inevitable, not because of any providential sense of 
deserved punishment, but simply because this is how Fortune works: wherever her favour lies 
today, it will lie somewhere else tomorrow.  
 
Of course, Callapine’s faith in Fortune turns out to be misplaced, as Tamburlaine soon adds 
him to his list of vanquished enemies. In one sense this accords entirely with the de casibus 
notion of Fortune’s slipperiness; the moment Callapine puts his faith in Fortune’s 
capriciousness working in his favour is the moment that she begins to appear unwaveringly 
constant in her favouring of Tamburlaine. To place one’s trust in Fortune, even if that is to 
trust her to be untrustworthy, is to seal one’s own fate. But at the same time as Callapine is 
given this lesson in de casibus morality — indeed, as a necessary condition of Callapine 
receiving this lesson — Tamburlaine seems to be exempt from its rules, as Fortune’s 
favouring of him appears to continue unabated. Tamburlaine’s audacious declaration early in 
the first part that ‘I hold the fates bound fast in iron chains / And with my hand turn Fortune’s 
wheel about’ (I.1.2.173–74) sends a clear signal to readers or audiences familiar with the de 
casibus tradition that an impending fall is likely, and elsewhere in the Marlowe canon this 
kind of expectation turns out to be justified: a similar boast made by Mortimer Jr in Edward 
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II is almost immediately succeeded by his downfall, for example.32 But, as Grande’s reading 
of the play notes, Tamburlaine’s ‘punishment’ for his imperious dismissal of Fortune is either 
unusually dilatory or even arguably never transpires at all. Indeed, such is the absence of any 
repercussion for his claims that the plays’ other characters begin to believe and even echo 
them, most notably when Anippe reassures a concerned Zenocrate with the following appeal: 
Madam, content yourself and be resolved 
Your love hath Fortune so at his command 
That she shall stay, and turn her wheel no more 
As long as life maintains his mighty arm 
That fights for honour to adorn your head. 
(I.5.1.373–77) 
 
According to this view, Fortune has effectively ceased to be Fortune, and her characteristic 
instability has been transformed into stasis. As well as dismissing Fortune herself, 
Tamburlaine directly contradicts the contemptus mundi morality that de casibus tragedy 
traditionally uses her to elucidate: in the plays’ most famous speech, he declares that ‘Nature, 
that framed us of four elements / Warring within our breasts for regiment, / Doth teach us all 
to have aspiring minds’, and that, as a result of this, no prize can be greater valued than ‘the 
ripest fruit of all, / That perfect bliss and sole felicity, / The sweet fruition of an earthly 
crown’ (I.2.7.18–20; 27–29). It is difficult to imagine a more eloquent expression of precisely 
the kind of thinking at which Fortune-based de casibus tragedy took aim, yet for another 
eight acts Tamburlaine’s successes continue to pile one upon the other. 
 
It is also striking that Tamburlaine’s achievements are of a kind specifically singled out for 
condemnation in Lydgate’s Fall of Princes. Much is made in the first act of Tamburlaine’s 
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modest origins, as he volubly espouses a meritocratic world view, asserting to Zenocrate that 
‘I am a lord, and so my deeds shall prove, / And yet a shepherd by my parentage’, before 
memorably rendering this idea visible by exchanging his shepherd’s weeds for ‘complete 
armour’ and ‘curtle axe’ (I.1.2.34–35; 42). But Tamburlaine’s stage-managed 
metamorphosis, however impressive, cannot entirely divest him of the spectre of his low 
birth; as Orcanes reminds him in the third act of part two, for all of his power, he remains, in 
the eyes of those with whom he presumes to seek war, a ‘shepherd’s issue, base-born 
Tamburlaine’ (II.3.5.77). That Tamburlaine’s origin is raised both by himself and his 
opponents is significant in a de casibus context, since this places him in a category of 
individual singled out by Lydgate as being most likely to suffer a precipitous fall. In his 
narrative detailing the rise to power of Flavius Rufinus, ‘chamberlain’ to the eastern Roman 
Emperor Theodosius I, Lydgate notes that ‘Hye clymbinge up hath oft an unware fall / And 
specyally whan it is sodeyn / fro lowe degre to estate imperiall’; such is the fate of those who 
‘have forget the grounde of their gynnynge’.33 Another of Lydgate’s instances of sudden 
social climbing results in a particularly resonant outcome in terms of Marlowe’s Tamburlaine 
plays. In the narrative of the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes, a knight who 
propelled himself into power by marrying the widow of Constantine, a reversal of this great 
fortune is occasioned by the arrival of Alp Arslan (rendered here as ‘Belset Tarquynyan’), the 
sultan of the Seljuk empire. After being defeated in battle, Diogenes suffers the following 
indignity at the hands of his conqueror: 
Take he was and brought by great disdeyne 
In whom as tho there was no resistence 
To kynge belset called tar[q]uynyan 
And whan he cam to his prsence 
Ageyns him was yove this sentence 
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To lye down plat and that kinge belset 
Shulde take his fote and on his throte set 
 
This was done for an hye despyte 
Dyogenes brought forth on a cheyne 
without reverence favoure or respite 
At great festys assigned was his payne 
And aldrelaste put out his iyen twene 
The whele of fortune tourneth as a ball 
Sodeyn clymbynge axeth a sodeyn fall34 
This passage anticipates Tamburlaine’s notorious treatment of Bajazeth in part one of 
Marlowe’s play: he, too, is used as a footstool by his conqueror, and is presented captive, 
‘without reverence favoure or respite’ at a lavish feast. I do not wish to suggest that this 
episode in Lydgate represents an undiscovered source for Marlowe’s play; the humiliation of 
Bajazeth is detailed in a number of sixteenth-century chronicles that have been identified as 
likely sources of inspiration for the scene.35 But the parallels between Lydgate’s narrative and 
the Bajazeth episodes in the play are noteworthy, not least in terms of the moral interpretation 
that Lydgate appends to the story: Diogenes’s humiliation is another exemplar of the de 
casibus notion that a rapid elevation in status often precedes an equally swift demise. What is 
particularly interesting is that both of Marlowe’s most universally accepted sources interpret 
the humiliation of Bajazeth in a similar manner. Thomas Fortescue’s The Forest, which 
translates material from Pedro Mexia’s 1542 chronicle Silva de Varia Leción, recounts how 
Bajazeth was 
presented to the great Tamburlaine, who incontinently closed him up in a cage of iron, 
carrying him still with him whithersoever he after went, pasturing him with the 
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crumbs that fell from his table, and with other bad morsels, as he had been a dog. 
Whence assuredly we may learn not so much to affy in riches, or in the pomp of this 
world, for as much as he that yesterday was prince and lord of all the world almost, is 
this day fallen into such extreme misery that he liveth worse than a dog36 
  
Marlowe’s other main source, Petrus Perondinus’s chronicle Magni Tamerlanis Scytharum 
Imperatoris Vita (1553), extracts from the episode a similar lesson: 
He would humiliate him by using him as a mounting-block, stepping on to his back as 
he crouched; when he ate, he kept him tied up like a dog under a three-legged table, to 
be the butt of all as he ate the crumbs and scraps. For the rest of the time he was kept 
in an iron cage like a wild animal, a pitiable spectacle, a prime example of human 
affairs and of the fickleness of Fortune.37 
Crucially, this renders Tamburlaine a bifurcated figure in de casibus terms. As a shepherd 
who has risen to imperial heights he is an example par excellence of the kind of rapid social 
climbing and pride in earthly matters that ‘ought’ to precede a swift turn of Fortune’s wheel, 
yet as a humiliator of proud emperors he is also an instrument through which Fortune makes 
such turns of the wheel at the expense of others. Owing in a most obvious sense to their status 
as drama, the plays lack the narrative voice that serves in Marlowe’s sources to expound the 
moral significance of Tamburlaine’s deeds. But for a brief moment Tamburlaine’s position 
on the knife-edge between finding himself Fortune’s agent and Fortune’s fool is clearly 
articulated, when Zenocrate retreats from the scene of her husband’s slaughter of the virgins 
at Damascus to find the brained corpses of Bajazeth and Zabina: 
Those that are proud of fickle empery 
And place their chiefest good in earthly pomp — 
Behold the Turk and his great emperess! 
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Ah Tamburlaine my love, sweet Tamburlaine, 
That fightest for sceptres and for slippery crowns, 
Behold the Turk and his great emperess! 
(I.5.1.353–58) 
Zenocrate’s plea is a clear articulation of the logic of Fortune-based de casibus tragedy, 
confirming the significance of episodes in the play that audience members would have 
already recognised as tropes from the narrative tragic tradition. Yet for all that Zenocrate 
might seem like the best candidate for a moral raisonneur in the plays, the continued 
successes of the succeeding five acts do not seem to bear out her warning. Instead, the plays 
repeatedly evoke the fortunal logic of de casibus tragedy in order to apparently undermine it.  
 
One reason that the plays do not explicitly follow through on the contemptus mundi morality 
that they seem at times to be espousing is that, as in collections of de casibus narratives like 
The Fall of Princes and The Mirror for Magistrates, the sublunary supremacy of Fortune 
faces competition in this play-world from an understanding of the world based on more 
directly providential divine intervention. Sigismund, after his defeat at the hands of Gazellus 
and Orcanes, against whom he has conspired dishonourably, interprets his fall in this way, 
acknowledging that ‘God hath thundered vengeance from on high / For my accursed and 
hateful perjury’ (II.2.3.2–3). The clarity of Sigismund’s providential thinking is not 
characteristic of the play as a whole, however; just a few lines later, for example, 
Sigismund’s enemies consider a range of authorities to whom the same event might be 
attributed. The Muslim Orcanes, noting that ‘Christ or Mahomet hath been my friend’ 
(II.2.3.11), considers the possibility that his victory over his Christian opponent could be 
attributed either to the support of the prophet associated with his own faith, or to Christ’s 
punishment of the falsehood of one his own followers. Gazellus’s response to this suggests a 
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third, demystifying explanation: ‘’Tis but the fortune of the wars, my lord, / Whose power is 
often proved [i.e. understood as] a miracle’ (II.2.3.31–32). Gazellus suggests that to attribute 
the outcome of the battle to any deity or prophet is to rationalise after the fact what are 
merely random events (as the lower case ‘f’ implies, Gazellus employs the term ‘fortune’ to 
refer simply to luck). In the space of a few lines, then, one materialistic and two alternative 
providential interpretations of the same event are offered.  
 
The question of direct divine intervention is equally ambiguous when considered in relation 
to the plays’ protagonist. Just as the plays relate the idea of Tamburlaine doing the work of 
Fortune, they also allow him to present himself as an instrument of God’s punishment. As 
Roy Battenhouse notes, Tamburlaine evokes a providential theological tradition by styling 
himself as a ‘scourge of God’, from whom the wicked receive their divine retribution.38 In 
one of several examples of this kind of self-projection, Tamburlaine, faced with a horrified 
response to the killing of his son, Calyphas, explains to the king of Jerusalem that ‘I execute, 
enjoined me from above, / To scourge the pride of such as Heaven abhors’, before describing 
himself a few lines later as ‘The scourge of God and terror of the world’ (II.4.1.148–49; 154). 
Mark Hutchings observes in the phrase a ‘beautiful ambiguity’, positioning Tamburlaine as 
both one who scourges on behalf of God and one who scourges God;39 Tamburlaine 
demonstrates at various points attitudes that seem to accord with both interpretations of the 
phrase, asserting near the beginning of part one that any who attempted to strike him with a 
sword would find that ‘Jove himself will stretch his hand from heaven / To ward the blow 
and shield me safe from harm’ (I.1.2.179–80), and near the end of part one that ‘Jove, 
viewing me in arms, looks pale and wan, / Fearing my power should pull him from his 
throne’ (I.5.1.453–54).40 As with his braving of Fortune, no direct consequence seems to 
emerge from this direct affront to divine authority. The question of providence, and the 
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source from which it may or may not derive, is thus left unresolved by these plays; specific 
events are attributed variously to the intervention of different deities and to the vagaries of 
chance, and outrageous acts of hubris that might be expected to elicit a providential response 
pass by without incident.  
 
Crucially, however, while the plays undermine and complicate both the fortunal and 
providential frameworks of de casibus tragedy, they do not dismiss them altogether. Indeed, 
in the climactic (or perhaps anti-climactic) scenes of the second part, the sequence of events 
surrounding Tamburlaine’s death and the manner of their staging make available both a 
providential and a contemptus mundi reading, albeit in an oblique fashion. This sequence of 
events ostensibly, although not unquestionably, begins shortly after Tamburlaine’s defeat of 
Babylon when, apparently struck by the lack of either divine or mortal resistance to his 
military advances against his Muslim enemies, the conqueror stages a burning of the Qu’uran 
and challenges Mohammad to take vengeance on him. In doing so, Tamburlaine both 
dismisses the providential capacity of one religious authority and claims to act on behalf of 
another: 
In vain, I see, men worship Mahomet: 
My sword hath sent millions of Turks to hell, 
Slew all his priests, his kinsmen, and his friends, 
And yet I live untouched by Mahomet. 
There is a God full of revenging wrath, 
From whom the thunder and the lightning breaks, 
Whose scourge I am, and him will I obey. 
So, Casane, fling them in the fire. 
(II.5.1.178–85) 
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Thirty-two lines later, Tamburlaine begins to come down with a vaguely defined complaint, 
the cause of which is treated by the warlord and his lieutenant as a puzzling mystery: 
TAMBURLAINE: But stay, I feel myself distempered suddenly. 
TECHELLES: What is it dares distemper Tamburlaine? 
TAMBURLAINE: Something, Techelles, but I know not what 
(II.5.1.217–19) 
Placed directly alongside his provocation of Mohammad, the bafflement of Tamburlaine and 
Techelles takes on an absurdly comic quality, but in the context of the play the time elapsed 
between the provocation and the onset of the fatal distemper, coupled with the refusal of the 
play or any of its characters to explicitly link the former with the latter, has been sufficient to 
produce disagreement among critics as to the nature of the malady. J. B. Steane, for example, 
reads the episode providentially, stating that ‘if any placing can be assumed to be pointed and 
deliberate, this can’, while Daniel Vitkus, who refers to the plays’ ‘anti-providentialism’, 
suggests that ‘Tamburlaine’s death is caused by a radically material disease of the body, an 
elemental imbalance that is not produced by anything above or beyond his own physical 
anatomy’.41  
 
What is significant in relation to the present discussion is that, just as in the case of the fall of 
Sigismund, the cause of Tamburlaine’s demise is the subject of a profound uncertainty; the 
plays refuse to assert a correct moral or theological interpretation of their protagonist’s death, 
making equally plausible the suggestions that it is the result solely of an arbitrarily occurring 
physiological disorder or of a direct divine response to an act of hubris. Crucially, these 
competing interpretations of the plays’ climax correlate with the competing moral logics at 
work in the de casibus tradition. Reading Tamburlaine’s death as a direct outcome of his 
vaunts against Mohammad, of course, places the plays into a providential framework, 
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however belated the punishment may be. (And how typically provocative of Marlowe to 
construct events in such a way that if one reads Tamburlaine’s fall in these terms, it is an 
affront not to God or Christ but to Mohammad that has finally occasioned heavenly 
intervention.) If, however, Tamburlaine’s distemper is not the product of divine intervention, 
then its sudden onset — at the point where Tamburlaine’s power and pride seem to be at their 
peak — is an example of exactly the kind of arbitrariness of events for which Fortune stands 
as a metaphor. Whether or not Tamburlaine recognises a contemptus mundi moral to his own 
death — his declaration that ‘In vain I strive and rail against those powers / That mean 
t’invest me in a higher throne, / As much too high for this disdainful earth’ suggests that he 
understands it rather differently (II.5.3.120–22) — the spectacle of this hitherto indestructible 
man on his deathbed, brought low by illness and counting on a map the conquests he has 
failed to achieve, is bound to provoke some audiences to consider the absurdity of earthly 
ambition and pride in terrestrial achievements.  
 
Rather than evoking a monolithic sense of the de casibus tradition in order to undermine it, 
then, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine exploits an unresolved generic and theological tension that is 
inherent in the de casibus tradition itself. De casibus tragedy, with its conflicting models 
based on Fortune and providence — each promoting mutually incompatible notions of earthly 
causality — exhibits a spiritual confusion that is put to creative use by Marlowe in the 
construction of the profoundly agnostic world of these plays, which repeatedly ask but 
pointedly refuse to answer questions about the extent of divine involvement in mundane 
lives.  
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